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ABSTRACT 
Digital “intermediaries” have been the subject of the lawmakers’ interest 
both in the EU and elsewhere for at least two decades now. In recent 
years, however, and coinciding with the introduction of the new Digital 
Single Market Strategy in 2015, “platforms” in specific - rather than 
“intermediaries”, “information society services (ISSs)” or “networks” - 
have incresingly been the target of EU regulators’ attention. This article 
traces the EU’s increased focus on platforms and argues that its source 
can be found in a desire to respond to technology convergence. The first 
part of the article looks at why convergence and the emerging platform 
regulation stand in a relationship and attempts to outline the boundaries 
of that relationship. The second part argues that the EU has already 
undergone a regulatory shift from “services” to “platforms” and traces 
this idea from its 2015 DSM Strategy origins to several other documents, 
including the 2016 Communication on Platforms. The third part looks at 
how the emergence of the idea and its elevation to a policy goal has 
already prompted changes in each of the three regulatory layers. The 
concluding part establishes that the EU policy shift from ISSs, networks 
and services as main regulatory units to platforms is sector-specific and 
prompted by attempts to address convergence. I argue that this approach 
may not necessarily be beneficial and look into alternatives involving a 
rethink of platform regulation across rather than within different layers.  
1. INTRODUCTION: TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE & ITS 
CHALLENGES  
In 1997, the EU issued a Green Paper on the convergence of 
telecoms, media and IT technologies and its implication for regulation.1 
In it, the Commission stated that the “convergence is occurring at the 
technological level.” Summarising the phenomenon, the document 
defined it as the ability of both new and traditional communications 
services (voice, data, sound and pictures) to be conveyed over many 
different networks or, in other words, the ability of different networks to 
carry similar services. Rather than each requiring own infrastructure, the 
technology has enabled all converged services to be provided over the 
Internet. While there is increasing confusion over the meaning of the 
                                                        
1 European Commission, Green Paper on the Convergence of the 
Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications 
for Regulation, 3. 12. 1997., COM(97)623 (1997 Green Paper). 
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term convergence,2 scholars are in agreement on its main feature: the 
blurring of the boundaries between telecommunications, broadcasting 
and the information society services. This, in turn, opens up the question 
of whether the sharp dividing lines between telecommunications, media 
and ISS policies also need to be gradually erased. The 1997 paper 
signified the launch of a convergence strategy at the EU level and the 
arousing of EU interest in the implications of converged technologies on 
regulation. 
Today, convergence is both still relevant and more manifest than 
before: the majority of telecoms, media and IT services are provided 
exclusively over the Internet. While traditional television and radio are 
still in existence, they are being threatened by streaming services, VoIP 
telephone has largely replaced the fixed one, newspapers in print are 
being digitised and SMS messaging is being pushed out by its digital 
counterparts. The implications of this should be clear - economies based 
on knowledge and innovation depend on services and these are delivered 
at decreasing prices and increasing efficiency - thanks to convergence. 
But, to what extent have converged services really resulted in converged 
policies in the follow-up to the 1997 paper? In this paper I will argue that 
the most manifest policy change in recent years has been a shift in 
regulation from services to platforms and that, rather than being a 
natural way to address convergence, this attempt subjects new 
phenomena to old laws. 
The title of the 1997 Green Paper already suggested that EU was 
acutely aware that convergence must have some impact on regulation. It 
postulated that regulatory barriers at different levels of the market can 
hinder the development of new services. The rules defined for “national, 
analogue and mono-media environment” are claimed not to be suitable 
for the converged ones and new models are explored. The Green Paper 
itself suggests that three such potential regulatory models might be 
possible. The first would maintain legacy regulation3 without substantive 
modification. This model had not been used in EU IT regulation. The 
second model would carve out new regulation but only where needed 
and largely within the existing regulatory and enforcement structures. 
This has been the regulatory model impliedly adopted and most of EU 
laws in the digital world still use it in some form or another. The third 
model would radically reassess the way new converged services need to 
                                                        
2 See Michael Latzer, “Convergence, Co-evolution and Complexity in European 
Communications Policy”, in K. Donders et al. (eds.) The Palgrave Handbook of 
European Media Policy (Palgrave Macmillan 2014). 
3  By legacy regulation we mean laws that applied to pre-Internet networks and services.  
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be regulated, abandon the existing laws and write completely new ones, 
based on converged services. This is, I will argue in Section 4, the model 
that needs to be applied to platforms in the future but has not been 
hitherto. 
While the 1997 document may suggest that convergence already 
plays its firmly-established role in EU policy, this is not the case. There 
are two signs testifying to the fact that a comprehensive EU policy in 
this field does not exist yet.4 First, for such a policy to exist, policy-
making would have to shift from separate policies to a converged one. 
Although the 1997 document might imply that this has already happened 
(or is about to), this is not the case. The Green Paper had only been a 
recognition of the realities of convergence and an invitation to a debate. 
A look at documents in the three regulatory layers5 reveals the existence 
of non-converged policies. In the latest wave of reforms of digital laws, 
prompted by the 2015 Digital Single Market Strategy,6 each of the three 
layers (ISSs, audio-video ands telecoms) have separate policy goals and 
principles and are equipped with different tools to achieve them. This 
confirms the view that Member States are reluctant to abandon the 
legacy policies which have, after all, been a long time in the development 
and required substantial political compromise. Second, a comprehensive 
approach to convergence would also imply that regulatory and 
enforcement structures have shifted from vertical to horizontal. This has 
not happened either. In telecommunications, national regulatory 
authorities are charged with enforcement of telecoms policies.7 In the 
ISS world, this is the case with business authorities, consumer protection 
agencies, data protection authorities and others. In audio-video world, 
the enforcement is in the hands of broadcasting and other agencies. 
There are no regulatory authorities in charge of converged "platforms".  
                                                        
4 For an overview of EU regulatory reaction to convergence in the earlier parts of the 
century see Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, European Communications Law and Technological 
Convergence: Deregulation, re-regulation and regulatory convergence in television and 
telecommunications (Kluwer 2012). 
5 The digital world, as will be seen in Section 2 below, is subject to three separate policy 
and regulatory “circles”, which co-exist with each other and which - each from their 
own perspective - regulate intermediaries as and when needed. The first, telecoms 
framework, applies to the carriage of signals. The second covers information society 
services (ISSs) and the third audio-video media services (AVMS) - both on the content 
layer. 
6 6.5.2015 COM(2015) 192 final. 
7 The idea of a single EU agency has been flashed but never adopted due to high 
resistance from Member States. The ultimate goal of moving from ex ante to 
competition regulation of telecoms, however, would confirm the declared desire to 
match convergence in the real world with convergence in regulation.  
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Based on the developments above, a preliminary conclusion could 
be drawn: the EU lawmaker seems to believe that the fact that the same 
services are delivered over different networks does not make these 
services the same nor does it necessarily imply that they should be 
regulated through a single regulatory framework. But this does not mean 
that EU does not regulate platforms. On the contrary. As will be 
demonstrated in Section 3, new laws specifically targeting platforms have 
been proposed since 2015. This leads to another observation which is 
crucial in this paper: the EU regulator feels prompted to regulate 
platforms resulting from converged services by simply translating the 
legacy regulatory objectives to them. This statement, as will be discussed 
in Section 4 below, informs the EU’s regulatory approach to 
convergence and to platforms from 2015 up to the present moment. I 
will argue that this approach already is and will continue to be the source 
of considerable conflict in the future because legacy tools may not be 
capable of addressing horizontal services. 
Two main claims are made in this paper. The first is that 
convergence forced the EU to think about platforms and move from its 
decades-old approach to IT regulation. The second is that the EU’s 
model for platform regulation is not based on a thorough rethink of the 
role of converged platforms but attempts to translate the regulatory aims 
and principles of the pre-platform era.  
The first claim is that converging technologies and the emergence 
of platforms stand in a relationship. This relationship had already been 
indicated in the 90s. The most prescient statement in the 1997 Green 
Paper is that converging technologies lead to “platform independence” 
and it is the implication of this statement for the regulation of modern 
digital economy that is the subject of this paper. Rather than rely on 
single networks (usually proprietary, sometimes government-owned but 
often government-controlled), platforms can choose the one that best 
suits their own and the needs of their clients, thus making them 
independent and, by analogy, more efficient. While I am not claiming 
that convergence has been the only cause of the emergence of 
platforms,8 I maintain that it has been one of the main causes, since 
network effects stand both as the main consequence of convergence and 
as the trigger for platform deployment. Put in different words, 
convergence has created network effects by making services more 
accessible and cheaper. This, in turn, enabled business models based on 
                                                        
8 There is as yet insufficient research to explain the rise of platform-economy. 
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platforms - which only work where there are network effects - to 
flourish. 
More than 20 years after the EU Green Paper, the digital economy 
is the economy of platform independence.9 The transformative power of 
converged platforms arises from the ability to connect market actors in 
unprecedented ways, eliminating the gatekeepers and lowering 
transaction costs, thus opening possibilities for new value creation. 
Platforms have become ubiquitous precisely because of their ability to 
transform the linear model of doing business by facilitating the exchange 
of goods and services. Platforms which do not own any production 
capacity themselves are able to transform businesses by dramatically 
lowering the cost of B2B and B2C interaction. The regulator’s interest in 
platforms should, therefore, not come as a surprise. Most companies 
have either moved to platforms models already or are in the process of 
doing so. While it is difficult to define platforms due to their diversity 
and numbers, there are a couple of common elements that define them: 
they are technology-enabled businesses that facilitate interactions 
between different groups. In this, they are synonymous with 
"intermediaries".10 Although there is no official EU definition of 
platforms, the 2016 Commission Staff Working Document 
accompanying the Communication on platforms,11 and in line with an 
earlier attempt at a definition,12 platforms are defined as “two-sided” or 
“multi-sided” markets “where users are brought together by a platform 
operator in order to facilitate a transaction”.13 
I have indicated earlier that EU regulators chose to adapt its 
present legacy rules to the needs of convergence. This means that no 
horizontal policies (those that target converged platforms rather than 
only services of a particular type) have been developed. In spite of this, 
there is no doubt that platforms stand as a distinct regulatory unit in the 
minds of EU regulators, since not only does the EU maintain its distinct 
regime on intermediaries (thus singling them out as being something 
                                                        
9 See Geoffrey Parler, Marshall W Van Alstyne, Sangeet Paul Choudary, Platfrom 
Revolution (W.W. Norton & Company : New York 2016). 
10 Although not with Internet intermediaries, which are companies engaging in selling 
retail Internet access.  
11 European Commission, SWD(2016) 172. 
12 Public consultation on the regulatory environment for platforms, online 
intermediaries, data and cloud computing and the collaborative economy, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/public-consultation-regulatory 
environment-platforms-online-intermediaries-data-and-cloud, accessed 7.11.2016. 
13 This definition makes little sense, as there are no reasons why platforms could not be 
one-sided (e.g. serving only members of a club or a gaming community).  
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different than platforms), but it also usually explicitly emphasises that 
there is no need for its change. The EU regulation of platforms arises 
from the need to address convergence but stands on the shoulders of its 
vertical policies in three layers of digital regulation.  
In addition to saying that convergence and platform regulation 
stand in a direct relationship, this article’s second main claim is that the 
EU’s platform regulation is inadequate. While documents referred to in 
sections 2 and 3 testify to the Commission’s interest in platforms and 
confirm its awareness of the problem, attempts to regulate platforms 
remain problematic. The reason for this is not only that the EU’s 
attempts to regulate platforms clash with its existing laws on information 
society services (ISSs) and networks & services (telecoms) but also that 
platforms remain diverse by type, function and business model. To 
believe, as the EU does, that telecoms providers, transport services, 
streaming media and user-generated sites should all be treated the same 
is, at best, naïve and, at worst, counterproductive. Convergence may very 
well have been the trigger for EU’s interest in platforms but does not, in 
and of itself, justify a unified approach. 
The emergence of platforms, just like converged technologies, 
problematises the Commission's legacy "silo" model of regulation where 
carrier (telecoms wires) and content (what these wires carry) have their 
own regulatory circles. In this paper, I put forward two claims regarding 
that model. The first, examined in Section 2, is that the slow but gradual 
policy shift in the EU from networks and services to platforms as main 
subjects of regulation results not from a coherent set of new objectives 
but from a desire to make platforms fit current objectives. The second 
claim, examined in Section 3, is that the move to platforms as regulatory 
objects in the new proposals results from the need to overcome the 
legacy regulatory model of non-converged services and answer to 
specific challenges of convergence. I will argue that this move will prove 
to be inadequate precisely because an overarching convergence-based 
platform policy is lacking. Finally, in Section 4, in criticism of this 
approach, I look at the alternative regulatory models for platforms 
stranding the content and carrier and submit the claim that platforms 
require an integrated rather than silo approach. If governments desire to 
regulate the intermediaries efficiently, they need to abandon the legacy 
approach based on networks and services in favour of objectives and 
tools that better match the new reality.  
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2. FROM “SERVICES” TO “PLATFORMS” - THE EMERGENCE 
OF A NEW POLICY 
2.1. THE “SILO” APPROACH 
A careful reader attempting to look at how the EU regulated 
“platforms” in its IT laws in the early 2000s would hardly notice the 
word mentioned in any of the policy documents then circulated. A 
further, more detailed, analysis of the relevant laws would not be more 
revealing either. A conclusion that platforms are not the subject of EU 
regulatory effort would, therefore, quickly impose itself and would, 
partially at least, be correct. What would be noticed, instead, is that the 
digital world is subject to three separate regulatory circles, each 
developed before technological convergence took swing. 
The first of these applies to the transmission of signals. This is the 
regulation of “wires” that carry the signal or, in technical terms, of 
electronic networks and services. This regulatory circle, the outline of 
which had been laid down in various laws in the late 80s but which, in its 
present form dates to 2002, with some important revisions being 
proposed in 2009, is traditionally referred to as Telecommunications 
Regulatory Framework.14 In 2016 the Commission suggested significant 
reform, including codification of different directives.15 The proposals are 
still pending as of May 2018. The main policy objective in telecoms has 
traditionally been to liberalize telecoms networks and service followed by 
a degree of harmonization. The chosen tool has been ex ante asymmetric 
regulation of undertakings with the significant market power. 
The second regulatory circle applies to the content being carried 
through wires. In broadest terms it can be described as encompassing all 
information society services (ISSs) which, in turn, are defined as services 
provided at a distance, for remuneration (although not necessarily against 
a payment) and at an individual request (rather than being broadcast). 
These services encompass the entirety of content distributed on the 
Internet. The framework directive in this area is the E-Commerce 
                                                        
14  European Commission, Regulatory framework for electronic communications in the 
European Union, December 2009, available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/sites/digital-
agenda/files/Copy%20of%20Regulatory%20Framework%20for%20Electonic%20Co
mmunications%202013%20NO%20CROPS.pdf 
15 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (Recast) - 
COM(2016)590. For details, see Andrej Savin, EU Telecommunications Law (Edward 
Elgar: Cheltenham 2018). 
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Directive,16 although separate laws cover copyright, privacy, payments, 
consumer protection, jurisdiction, etc.17 The main policy objective has 
been to facilitate the free movement of information society services and 
the main tool has been home country control, limited ISP liability and 
comprehensive data and consumer protection measures. 
The third regulatory circle, which covers media in general, revolves 
around content over which there exists editorial control. Typically, this 
category is defined as encompassing audio-video media services. The 
AVMS Directive18 is the framework directive that controls this area. The 
main policy objective has been the free movement of audio-video media 
services and the main tool home country control coupled with various 
content-control measures.  
The current regulatory model - and this is a crucial point in this 
paper - is a vertical model based on three separate regulatory pillars.19 In 
this model, electronic communications, linear and non-linear audio-
visual and information society services are each subject to separate 
regulatory framework. That separate pillars existed in the 80s and 90s, 
when the respective frameworks had been set up, should come as no 
surprise. There would have been no converged services and no need for 
converged laws. However, while technology has been converging, 
regulatory layers have largely not. Where they have, this has been forced 
through practical problems of convergence.  
The subject of regulatory intervention of each circle, respectively, 
are telecoms networks and services, information society services and 
audio-video media services. Platforms do not feature in any of the three. 
This is partially a result of the choice made following the 1997 Green 
Paper: no new regulatory framework in response to convergence. In a 
paper written in 2016, deStreel and Larouche explore the possibility of 
targeted regulatory framework for digital networks and services and 
                                                        
16 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ L 178/1, 17.7.2000. 
17 For details, see Andrej Savin, EU Internet Law (2nd edition, Edward Elgar: 
Cheltenham 2017). 
18 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 
2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media 
services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), OJ L 95/1, 15.4.2010. For a proposal 
for update, see COM/2016/0287, 25.5.2016. 
19 See also Alexandre de Streel and Pierre Larouche, An Integrated Regulatory 
Framework for Digital Networks and Services, CERRE Policy Report, CERRE Report, 
27 January 2016.  
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advise the Commission to abandon the current vertical model in favour 
of one “based on horizontal layers, distinguishing between digital 
networks and all types of digital services.”20.  
The key point requiring new laws is precisely the substitutability of 
different services. Since such services can be easily substituted, the 
existence of separate regulatory silos is superficial. But, although 
substitutability may point in the direction of “level playing field”, which 
is the idea that like services should be regulated alike, this is not what is 
claimed here. There is a subtle difference between applying the existing 
laws to a new category of services and creating new laws for it. The level 
playing field does the former. Convergence arguably requires the latter. 
The lack of converged laws, coupled with an ad hoc approach to 
regulating platforms (explored in Section 3) may have unexpected results 
since regulatory objectives, principles and regulatory tools do not 
correspond to the technological and social realities.  
2.2. THE SHIFT TO PLATFORMS 
Starting from 2015, when the Digital Single Market Strategy had 
been adopted, an interesting trend can be noted. The EU policy 
documents gradually begin talking about regulating "platforms" rather 
than "networks" or "services" and the proposals on platform regulation 
are openly debated and tabled (see Section 3 below). These calls signal a 
shift to platforms as legitimate regulatory targets. There should be no 
confusion here. A platform can be subject to different sector-specific 
laws, competition, advertising, telecoms, etc., without special platform-
specific rules or, indeed, policies. This has been the case since the mid 
90s when the Internet gradually emerged as a medium. A platform-
specific law, however, targets platforms only. A policy shift would signify 
a move from a more traditional regulatory model to platform-specific 
laws. Such a shift can result from a comprehensive policy or a set of ad 
hoc corrections. 
It is important to emphasise that platforms in the EU have not 
been targeted as a result of a comprehensive call for the analysis of their 
effects on the economy. This is a point of considerable importance. The 
general regulatory direction in the digital world has always been clear. 
Rather than a change in the agenda, the move has been local and a result 
of the perceived disruption that platforms have caused deeper down the 
policy tree and a desire to address it. Thus (see Section 3), OTT 
platforms needed to be brought to a level playing field with the 
                                                        
20 Alexandre de Streel, Pierre Larouche, ibid 8. 
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traditional ones, user-generated services needed to be forced to install 
filtering and video distribution platforms needed to be made similar to 
traditional linear television.  
The absence of a general policy direction in the most important 
document is nothing short of striking. The 2015 DSM suggested that 
market power of some platforms may be a reason for concern. In 
response to that, it claimed that a “fit for purpose environment for 
platforms and intermediaries” is needed. No further comment is offered, 
making this one of the shortest policy elaborations on offer. Combatting 
illegal content online, in particular, is alleged to be in the need of action. 
Here, the Commission suggests that platforms facilitate the distribution 
of illegal content. The Commission promises action in five areas: 
transparency in search results, platforms’ use of information they collect, 
relations between platforms and suppliers, intra-platform movability of 
users and illegal content. No detailed analysis of the nature of platforms, 
their emergence or their operation is offered or referred to here. 
Platforms are taken for granted as is the fact that future intervention 
might be necessary. Although the promised platform regulatory 
intervention is classified under one of the three other proposed reforms 
of the Digital Single Market, there is little doubt that the lawmakers give 
it relative importance.  
A number of follow-up documents set the Commission’s promised 
action in motion and set out the foundations for the EU policy on 
platforms. The 2016 Communication on platforms was followed by a 
2017 Communication and 2018 Guidelines on Illegal Content. Although 
lacking mandatory force of law, the three documents serve as guidelines 
and, in the case of 2018, as a benchmark to be met in case targeted 
stakeholders wish to avoid further legislation. 
The 2016 Communication on Platforms21 is a neither a 
comprehensive document on platforms nor a proper policy paper but a 
brief 15-page-long outline of the principles that the Commission declares 
will guide it in its effort to regulate platforms and an outline of the ways 
in which these principles will be implemented. To be the former, it lacks 
a commissioned body of research normally accompanying other 
proposals and to be the latter it lacks separate objectives and tools 
(although it does declare some basic principles). The Communication 
begins with a brief and relatively superficial overview of the importance 
of platforms. The principles the Commission promises to take into 
account are: 
                                                        
21 25.5.2016 COM(2016) 288 final. 
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• a level playing field for comparable digital services; 
• responsible behaviour of online platforms to protect core 
values; 
• transparency and fairness for maintaining user trust and 
safeguarding innovation;  
• open and non-discriminatory markets in a data-driven 
economy.  
Several important policy goals can nevertheless be discerned from 
this. Probably the most striking statement is the idea that a level playing 
field should exist for comparable digital services. Put in other words, this 
means that like should be regulated alike. Although the level playing field 
has not been formulated properly in legal theory, it is occasionally used 
in different policies to either decrease the burden on the incumbent 
provider or to increase the burden on the disruptive one. Kenny and 
Suter22 suggest that the ‘level playing field’ argument only makes sense a) 
if the parties operate in the same market, b) if the regulation is actually 
burdensome on one but not on the other party, c) whether the regulation 
as a whole favours one party but not the other and, finally, d) if the 
benefits of symmetric regulation actually outweigh the benefit of 
asymmetric. It is doubtful whether level playing field should be applied 
as a general principle for regulating digital platforms which are as diverse 
in their design as they are in the choice of the business model they apply. 
Similar doubts can be raised in respect of “responsible behaviour”, 
“transparency” or “fairness” - terms which are vague and would be left 
to national courts. 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission promises action in three 
separate areas. First, it promises to bring a level playing field to OTT 
services. The suggestion is that telecoms rules should be reviewed and 
that scope and extent of existing legislation should be reduced 
(deregulation) while applying a limited set of laws to all comparable 
services (harmonisation).23 The second promise is to ensure that online 
platforms “act responsibly”. While this refers to increased instances of 
copyright violations, hate speech and other transgressions online, the 
reality is that the illegalities referred to are diverse. The promised action 
include reforming of the Audio-visual Media Services Directive, a new 
copyright package and self-regulation.24 Very significantly, the 
                                                        
22 Robert Kenny & Tim Suter, “An unraveling of the Digital Single Market, A Review 
of the Proposed AVMSD” (Communications Chambers 2016). 
23 This will be analysed in Section 3.1 below. 
24 These are analysed in Section 3.2 below. 
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Communication does not promise a radical change in the regime for 
intermediary liability.25 The third step is “fostering trust, transparency 
and fairness” and relates to first, reform of consumer protection laws 
and, second, to fairness in business-to-consumer relations.26 The final 
suggestion is to keep open and non-discriminatory markets in the effort 
to foster a data-driven economy. 
Fulfilling some of the promises made in the 2016 Communication, 
the Commission followed up with the 2017 Communication on Tackling 
Illegal Content Online and the 2018 Recommendation on the same 
subject. Unlike the 2016 Communication on Platforms, which is a policy 
outline specifically targeting platforms, these documents are more 
general in seeking to eliminate different types of illegal content, not 
necessarily only generated or spread by platforms. Nevertheless, it is 
abundantly clear that platforms are the real target of any intended action. 
The 2017 Communication, for example, contains the words “towards an 
enhanced responsibility of online platforms” as its subtitle, leaving little 
doubt as to its objectives. 
The 2018 Recommendation is in particular important as a policy 
paper since it threatens27 action unless the changes it proposes are not 
followed. This indicates the Commission’s impatience but also a change 
in attitude as threats of this kind are relatively rare in EU law. The 
Recommendation starts from the premise that platforms ought to be 
more proactive and do more to step up the fight against illegal content 
online. The Commission makes the assumption that “platforms” ought 
to be the target of such efforts. Little or no effort is made to distinguish 
between different types of platforms and little evidence is otherwise 
provided to support the Commission’s claims. Furthermore, the 
document declares that no clash is intended or created with Articles 12-
15 of the E-Commerce Directive. As I will discuss in Section 3.2 below, 
this is precisely a sudden shift in policy that generates conflict. The 
Recommendation calls for clearer ‘notice and action’ procedures, more 
efficient tools and proactive technologies, stronger safeguards to ensure 
fundamental rights, special attention to small companies and closer 
cooperation with authorities. Special rules are introduced for “terrorist” 
content online and this includes the obligation to remove such content 
                                                        
25 Articles 12-14 of the E-Commerce Directive protect intermediaries (as conduits, 
caches and hosts) from liability until the moment of notification. Article 15 removes 
the obligation of permanent monitoring.  
26 The latter is looked at in Section 3.2 below. 
27 Cf. Preamble 33. 
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within an hour of referral, faster detection and removal, better referral 
and regular reporting to the Commission, in particular about referrals.  
The problems with the Guidelines are abundant. First, they lack 
effective safeguards. The safeguards they do provide are either vague or 
left to Member States. Second, the monitoring, which would effectively 
arise as an obligation if the Guidelines were to be followed, is in conflict 
with Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive. Finally, different kinds of 
illegal content do not necessarily lend themselves to similar mechanisms 
for removal. 
An analysis of the policy documents drafted since 2015 reveals a 
surprising approach to platforms. First, the post-2015 approach cannot 
be labelled a proper policy as it lacks separate objectives, principles and 
tools, borrowing, instead, heavily from legacy policies. Second, there is 
no doubt that the common thread is the fear that platforms may 
facilitate the spreading of illegal content online and the fear that 
platforms may treat different players on the market unfairly. Thus, 
platforms need to be “more transparent” and “more responsible” and 
the “level playing field” needs to be imposed on different market players. 
While lip service is paid to platforms’ importance, the EU policy is not 
enabling new and improved uses nor is it designed to promote. Instead, 
it can be labelled as “defensive” or “reactive”. Such as it is, the new 
policy has shifted the regulatory interest. Section 3 reveals whether the 
new focus has brought significant changes.  
3. CONVERGED PLATFORMS IN THE NEW PROPOSALS  
In the previous section, I have demonstrated that the EU gradually 
included platforms in some of its documents, in spite of the absence of a 
comprehensive policy that would address platform regulation. I noted that 
the main aspect of this partial approach is an attempt to address 
platforms as a threat to existing business models. This new EU model 
gradually shifted the regulatory focus from intermediaries, networks and 
services, which were the regulatory units of most EU IT regulation in the 
90s and 00s, to platforms. The change took place consistently in each of 
the three content and carrier regulatory circles described in Section 2.1 
In each of them, platforms brought about by the converged 
technological reality caused a defensive policy shift and brought a 
proposal shielding legacy technologies from the converged platforms. 
The effect is least prominent in the main part of the new telecoms 
proposal but is apparent in each of the other layers.  
In telecoms services, converged OTT platforms threatening 
traditional telecoms models are subjected to traditional telecoms rules. In 
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information society services, collaborative platforms based on user-
generated content are subjected to traditional IP models. In audio-video 
media services, on-demand platforms are subjected to regulatory models 
suitable for linear broadcasting. I will look at each in turn. 
3.1. TELECOMS AND OTT SERVICES 
The European telecommunications regulatory framework in its 
present form dates to 2002. The main feature of that framework is that 
telecoms networks and services are subject to ex ante sector-specific 
regulation. Rather than regulate after the harm had taken place, as is the 
case with competition law, the lawmaker gives national telecoms 
authorities the right to impose remedies ex ante in all cases where a 
significant market power (SMP) exists and where there is a risk that 
anticompetitive effects might follow. The telecoms framework consists 
of general rules (Framework Directive28), coupled with the rules on 
authorisation (Authorisation Directive29), access (Access Directive30), 
universal service (Universal Service Directive31) and privacy (ePrivacy 
Directive32). 
Changes to the EU telecommunications regulatory package have 
been tabled in 2016,33 after an abortive attempt in 2015.34 The proposal 
aims to codify the present laws, modernise various aspects that are 
considered to be outdated, streamline the procedural aspects and remove 
regulatory barriers to investment. Among the most notable challenges 
the EECC had to address, however, is the status of over-the-top 
providers (OTTs). In simplest terms, OTTs can be defined as media 
companies that distribute content and services (VoIP, instant messaging, 
streaming, etc.) through the Internet rather than other proprietary 
channels. OTT services are the result of a converged Internet and a 
manifestation of what such an Internet means in practice. Instead of 
relying on their own purpose-built networks, which would be subject to 
telecoms regulation, OTTs use the Internet, thus falling under the 
definition of information society services (ISSs). As such, they are 
                                                        
28 Directive 2002/21. 
29 Directive 2002/20. 
30 Directive2002/19. 
31 Directive 2002/22/EC. 
32 Directive 2002/58. 
33 Proposal for a European Electronic Communications Code (EECC), 14.9.2016. 
COM(2016) 590 final. 
34 The 2013 proposal, COM(2013) 627 final, have been significantly reduced so that the 
regulation adopted in 2015 only dealt with roaming and net neutrality, Regulation 
2015/2120 (EU), OJ L310/1, 26.11.2015. 
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subject to the significantly simpler and less onerous regime that covers 
ISSs.35  
The incumbent telecommunications companies argue that OTTs 
compete unfairly and that either the regulatory regime imposed on them 
should be relaxed and/or that OTTs should be subject to telecoms-style 
ex ante regulation. The Impact Assessment document for the telecoms 
proposal leaves no doubt that the Commission is aware of the problem 
but also leaves the impression that no radical measures were 
contemplated.36 Having considered the options, the EECC proposal 
addresses the issue in a significant but measured way, proposing a 
somewhat changed definition of electronic communications services as a 
solution. In its Article 2(4), it suggests that telecoms services are Internet 
access services and interpersonal communication services. The latter are 
then divided into number-dependent and number-independent ones. It 
then subjects the number-dependent interpersonal communication 
services to a limited set of obligations, with the effect of putting the 
converged OTT services under the scope of some of the obligations, 
albeit very limited ones.  
A somewhat more radical intervention is envisaged in the ePrivacy 
Regulation,37 designed as a replacement of the 2002 ePrivacy Directive.38 
Recital 11 and Article 4(1)(b) of the Proposal directly refer to EECC 
definition of electronic communications services which, in turn, now 
covers interpersonal communication services. Article 2(1) subjects such 
services to the new proposed Regulation. Significantly, the EECC 
definition of electronic communications services informs the two 
proposals differently. While the EECC only subjects OTT services (and 
only number-based ones at that) to a relatively restricted set of new rules 
(as seen in the preceding paragraphs), the ePrivacy Proposal suggests 
more radical changes. In principle, all obligations which the Proposal 
imposes on telecoms services apply equally both to traditional and to 
OTT services. This relates to confidentiality (Article 5), permitted 
processing (Article 6), storage and erasure (Article 7), protection of 
information (Article 8), consent (Article 9) and others (Chapters III, IV 
and V). This means that a very wide group of platforms – those 
providing interpersonal communication services – are fully subject to 
ePrivacy rules. While it is unclear whether the proposal would be 
                                                        
35 BEREC, Report on OTT Services, January 2016, BoR (16) 35. 
36 14.9.2016 SWD(2016) 304 final. 
37 10.1.2017 COM(2017) 8 final. 
38 Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ L 201/37, 31.7.2002. 
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adopted and, if so, in what form, if it is adopted in its present form, this 
would signify a significant shift to significantly more regulated OTTs.  
Two observations can be made in respect of the latest telecoms 
proposals and their potential impact on the regulation of platforms. Each 
is, in its own right, revealing. First, the changes have been prompted by 
convergence. This is one of the instances where the preparatory 
documents declare the aims very clearly, both for the EECC39 and the 
ePrivacy Regulation.40 In this sense, there is no doubt that the proposals 
are informed by the realities of the converged Internet. Second, there is a 
shift from networks and services to platforms as regulatory units at least 
in case of the ePrivacy Directive. While the EECC proposal extended 
the scope of telecoms rules to OTTs, it did so in a very narrow set of 
circumstances. This is not the case of the ePrivacy Proposal, which 
subjects platforms to its full set of tools, without going into details as to 
whether such legislation is appropriate. The difference in the two 
proposals could not be more striking. But, rather than rethink the need 
for privacy intervention in platforms of different kinds, the proposal 
simply extends the legacy regulatory objectives (comprehensive privacy) 
and tools (Articles 6, 8, 9, etc.) to platforms without fundamentally 
rethinking either. 
3.2. INFORMATION SOCIETY SERVICES AND FILTERING 
Information society services have for a long time been subject to a 
stable set of laws dating to late 90s and early 2000s. The framework 
directive in this area is the Electronic Commerce Directive from 2001.41 
The Directive subjects information society services, which are defined as 
services provided at a distance, by electronic means, at individual request 
and for remuneration (although not necessarily against a payment), to the 
laws of the home state, introduces some information requirements and 
insulates intermediaries from liability in a well-defined set of cases. In 
addition to this, sector-specific e-commerce laws have been passed 
covering a number of areas including copyright,42 privacy43 and consumer 
protection.44 
No open calls for revision of the E-Commerce Directive have been 
made, either in the 2015 Digital Single Market Strategy, nor in any of the 
other policy documents. On the contrary, policy papers mentioned in 
                                                        
39 Recital 7. 
40 Recital 11. 
41 Directive 2000/31/EC,OJ L178/1, 17.7.2000. 
42 Directive 2001/ 29/EC (InfoSoc), OJ L167/10, 22.6.2001. 
43 Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection), OJ L281/31, 23 November 1995. 
44 Directive 2011/ 83/EC (Consumer Rights), OJ L304/64, 22.11.2011. 
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Section 2 all declare that any changes, proposed or contemplated, do not 
modify general e-commerce laws and the ISP liability regime in specific.45 
The key components of that regime, I would argue, are home country 
control (Article 3(1)) and ISP liability insulation (Articles 12-15). While 
the former ensures that a provider acting legally in their state of origin 
can simply export their services, the latter ensures that such provider 
would not be liable for acts which it does not itself initiate or actively 
monitor.  
The 2015 DSM Strategy indicated a number of areas which the 
Commission promised to look into but a close look at the Strategy would 
not give the impression that deep-going changes are demanded. 
Nevertheless, several proposals have a significant impact for platform 
regulation and two in particular demonstrate the regulatory move from 
services to platforms which we have indicated in Section 2 as well as the 
translation of legacy-era objectives onto the platform world. 
The proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single 
Market46 is a result of a prolonged process of reform, prompted mostly 
by the increased demands for copyright law to take account of new 
technologies, changed patterns of production and use of intellectual 
property goods and increase in user-generated content. The Proposal 
aims to improve exceptions, improve licensing practices and “achieve a 
well-functioning marketplace for copyright”. In light of the latter, Article 
13 proposes measures on the use of protected content by ISP providers 
“storing and giving access to large amounts of works and other subject-
matter uploaded by their users.” The proposed text does not define such 
providers. The first obligation that they would have to be subjected to is 
to take measures to ensure the functioning of agreements concluded 
with rightholders in cooperation with them. This means an obligation to 
conclude appropriate licensing agreements. In the alternative (the text 
uses the connection “or”), i.e. in case these agreements have willingly not 
been concluded or have proven difficult or impossible, the providers 
have the obligation to prevent the availability on their services of works 
or other subject-matter identified by rightholders through cooperation 
with them. This includes measures for effective content recognition 
technologies which need to be appropriate and proportionate. 
Explaining the operation of the proposed measures in relation to Articles 
12-15 of the E-Commerce Directive, preamble 38 maintains that the 
regime outlined in Article 13 applies wherever the E-Commerce 
                                                        
45 p. 9 in the 2016 Communication, paragraphs 14 and 17 of the Preamble to 2018 
Recommendation, paragraph 38 of the Copyright in the DSM Proposal. 
46 14.9.2016 COM(2016) 593 final. 
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exception does not. This suggests that the lawmaker believes platforms 
to still be subject to ISP liability exemption. Hoping to clarify the 
situation further, it adds that 
it is necessary to verify whether the service provider plays an 
active role, including by optimising the presentation of the 
uploaded works or subject- matter or promoting them, irrespective 
of the nature of the means used therefor.  
Analysing the provisions in light of the current EU law and CJEU 
cases that interpret it, it is difficult to justify its existence and escape the 
feeling that, if adopted, it would cause a direct clash with existing laws.47 
There are several reasons for this. First, Article 15 of the E-Commerce 
Directive obliges Member States not to impose on ISPs a general 
obligation to monitor or to seek illegal activities. Article 13 of the 
Proposal demands that ISPs engage in automated monitoring in the 
form of “effective filtering”. Generic filtering requires monitoring by its 
very nature. Matters are further complicated by CJEU’s interpretation in 
SABAM which clearly indicates that generic and indiscriminate filtering 
is, in itself, illegal.48 This case has subsequently been slightly modified in 
UPC,49 where the Court ruled that injunctions not specifying the 
measures but allowing the ISP to demonstrate that it had taken all 
reasonable measures were legal. The difference, however, is that even 
under UPC it is the ISPs that bear the burden of proving that they took 
reasonable measures while under Article 13 a pre-defined set of such 
measures (state-of-the-art filtering) is imposed. 
Second, it would appear that the proposed Article 13 demands 
that either agreements should be concluded or that “effective” filtering 
should be installed. It then maintains that not complying with either of 
these two would remove the protection provided by Article 14 ECD. In 
other words, the Proposal maintains that only Article 13-compliant ISPs 
would benefit from Article 14 ECD. While it is true that Article 14 of the 
E-Commerce Directive provides exemption from liability only for bona 
fide providers, it is not clear why and when “optimising the 
presentation” might eliminate protection nor what amounts to 
                                                        
47 See, for example, Stalla-Bourdillon et al., ‘Open Letter to the European Commission - 
On the Importance of Preserving the Consistency and Integrity of the EU Acquis 
Relating to Content Monitoring within the Information Society’ (September 30, 2016). 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2850483. 
48 C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs 
SCRL (SABAM) , 24 November 2011, ECLI:EU:C2011:771. 
49 C-314/12 UPC Telekabel WIen GmbH v COnstantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega 
Filmproduktiongesellschaft GmbH, 27 March 2014, ECLI:EU:C2014:192. 
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“promoting” the works. This is in direct conflict with CJEU’s reading of 
Article 14 in both Google France50 and L’Oreal v eBay.51 In the former, the 
Court said that non-active providers should benefit from protection 
except where they, having obtained the knowledge, fail to act. In the 
latter, the Court suggests that only the operator who was well aware of 
the circumstances would lose the protection. Taken together with Article 
15, this should be taken to mean that ECD does not require filtering as 
an essential component for the existence of insulation from liability 
(although they may very well form part of an individual court order). 
The fascinating element in the Proposal is the clash in objectives 
and tools. While intermediaries in the legacy world are shielded as long 
as they lack information on the alleged illegalities (and, thereafter, 
remove or filter out specific content), the platforms in the new policy 
need to filter out in advance if they are to be shielded at all. In the 
former, the assumption is that intermediaries are innocent until proven 
otherwise. In the latter, they are assumed to be a spreading ground for 
illegal content.  
The proposal on the transparency on business-to-business 
platforms had first been announced in the 2015 DSM Strategy, where 
transparency in search results, platforms’ usage of information they 
collect and relations between platforms and suppliers have been flagged 
as areas of interest. In April 2018, following a detailed inquiry,52 the 
Commission proposed a Regulation on promoting fairness and 
transparency for business users of online intermediation services.53 As 
mentioned, in spite of the Commission’s declared reservations towards 
openly legislating on platforms, the policy documents do promise that 
some action will be taken. The main premise of the Proposal - that 
platforms act as gatekeepers on which businesses depend - represents a 
summary of one of the Commission’s main new policy positions 
regarding the digital world. The present proposal seems to be aimed at 
bringing extra requirements for clarity and transparency in situations 
where platforms could abuse their dominance.  
The regulation would apply to online intermediaries and search 
engines providing services to business users with a place of 
establishment in the EU and offering goods and services to EU 
consumers. It is not important for the purposes of the Proposal if 
platforms themselves have a place of business or residence in the EU, as 
                                                        
50 C-236/08 and C-238/08 [2010] ECR I-02417. 
51 C-324/09 12 July 2011, ECLI:EU:C2011:474. 
52 See Impact Assessment, 26.4.2018 SWD(2018) 138 final. 
53 26.4.2018 COM(2018) 238 final. 
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long as business users they offer services to have such a place and engage 
in targeting EU consumers. A platform based in the US (such as Google) 
would therefore fall in the scope of the regulation in as much as its 
clients are businesses dealing with EU consumers. Although the word 
“platforms” is only used in the preamble, there is no doubt that 
platforms are the real target. This means that a search engine or a social 
network based in the United States would fall under the new rules. 
Although the list of obligations the platforms would be subject to is 
diverse, it can be summarised as increased obligation of transparency in 
all situations where platforms’ actions could unfairly influence the 
businesses that rely on them. Particularly important, however, is Article 
5, forcing online platforms to set out in their terms and conditions the 
main parameters determining ranking and the reasons for their relative 
importance. Where businesses have an opportunity to pay to influence 
ranking, such possibility would also have to be disclosed. Online 
platforms do not have to disclose any trade secrets as defined in the EU 
Trade Secrets Directive. 
Two features of the Proposal, in particular, should cause concern. 
First, the Proposal covers search engines, on whose definition wide 
agreement exists, and “online intermediation services”, known as 
platforms both colloquially and in EU policy papers (see Section 2). The 
latter are defined in Article 2(2) as 
• information society services within the meaning of EU law;  
• which allow business users to offer goods or services to 
consumers, with a view to facilitating the initiating of direct 
transactions between those business users and consumers, 
irrespective of where those transactions are ultimately 
concluded;  
• provided to business users on the basis of contractual 
relationships between those business users and their own 
clients (business or private) 
This definition is exceptionally wide in its scope. In essence, it is 
enough for a platform to offer services facilitating the interaction 
between businesses and their clients for it to fall under the obligations. 
No financial threshold is offered and the platform need not operate on a 
subscription model (advertising income would be enough). 
The second problem is the scope of the proposed Article 5 
which would force platforms to disclose “the main parameters 
determining ranking and the reasons for the relative importance” of 
those parameters as opposed to others in their terms and conditions. 
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While the other demand, to disclose that ranking might be influenced by 
payment, is reasonable from the viewpoint of fair competition, the 
disclosure of ranking criteria is poorly defined. For search engines, 
paragraph 2 of Article 5 requires the main parameters determining 
ranking to be disclosed in an “easily and publicly available description, 
drafted in clear and unambiguous language.” Article 5(3) explicitly 
excludes the possibility of disclosure of any trade secrets as defined in 
Directive 2016/943. It is difficult to explain how platforms and search 
engines can release meaningful information without also releasing 
elements of trade secrets.  
Both proposals demonstrate the broad strokes with which the 
lawmaker aims to regulate platforms and search engines. While the 
Copyright in the DSM covers all user-generated websites (or at least a 
large majority thereof), the Transparency on business networks proposal 
covers all search engines and all platforms. It is true that the E-
Commerce Directive applies to all information society services, a 
category even broader than platforms. The nature of the regulatory 
intervention in that document, however, is radically different than the 
two proposals above. When the Clinton administration considered the 
best approach to regulating the Internet in the 90s, it adopted the laissez-
faire approach which, in turn, had influenced the drafters of the E-
Commerce Directive to take the enabling of free movement of 
information society services as its main goal.54 This leads to an important 
distinction between information society services and/or intermediaries as 
opposed to platforms as regulatory targets. While the EU policy in the 
case of the former had been drafted to enable their spread (home 
country control, limited liability), the policy in case of the latter had been 
mainly defensive - it has been targeting platforms as obstacles. This has 
meant that platforms in the ISS world have been taken out of the scope 
of legacy regulatory objectives (free movement of digital services) but taken 
within the scope of legacy tools (full liability, disclosure of ranking 
criteria). Even more significantly, this is not done with the objective of 
making platforms spread their services liberally but, on the contrary, with 
a view to preventing their (perceived and real) illegal activity. 
3.3. AUDIO-VIDEO MEDIA SERVICES AND VIDEO-ON-DEMAND 
Audio-video media services (AVMS), as indicated earlier, are 
regulated separately from information society and telecoms services. The 
                                                        
54 For deatails, see Andrej Savin, EU Internet Law (2nd edition, Edward ELgar: 
Cheltenham 2017), Chapter 1. 
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chief differentiating factor is the existence of editorial control: media are 
communication intermediaries with editorial control. Where media are 
not subject to such control, they may fall under one of the other 
frameworks. The purpose of the 2010 AVMS Directive was to bring 
minimum harmonisation in a number of areas but also to create a level 
playing field for emerging audio–video media, preserve cultural diversity, 
protect children and consumers, safeguard media pluralism, combat hate 
speech and guarantee the independence of national regulators.55 
Although the Directive is only a minimum/partial harmonisation of the 
relevant law, it covers a significant number of issues, including general 
principles, hate speech, protection of disabled users, promotion of EU 
works, jurisdiction, protection of minors and advertising. The Directive’s 
main regulatory tool - the home country control principle - subjects all 
audio-video services to the law of the country in which they originate.  
That convergence prompted the legislative changes is stated 
explicitly in the 2010 Directive (Preamble, paragraph 14). This is 
confirmed in Article 1, which states that all media - irrespective of the 
manner of delivery and the technology used – are covered. The linear 
(broadcast) and non-linear (on-demand) means of communications are 
thus both covered, with each also being subjected to a set of rules 
specific to their own mode of delivery.  
The 2013 Green Paper explored the effects of convergence further, 
paving the way for the reform of the 2010 Directive.56 The AVMS 
revision finally proposed in 2016 after a long period of consultations57 is 
under the direct influence of convergence between television and 
services distributed via the internet. In the proposed Article 28a, it 
subjects video-sharing platforms to special content-related obligations. 
The Commission gave three reasons to justify further need for regulatory 
reform: insufficient protection of minors and consumers on video-
sharing platforms; the lack of a level playing field between the new and 
old platforms, in addition to internal market problems; and, finally, 
inadequate rules regarding commercial communications. All three point 
to platforms, either specifically, as is the case with first two, or indirectly, 
                                                        
55 Directive 2010/13/EU, 15.4.2010., OJ L 95/1. See Mark D. Cole and Jenny 
Metzdorf (eds), The EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive: Comparative 
Commentary on the AVMSD and National Implementation (Nomos/Hart, Oxford 
2016).  
56 Green Paper, Preparing for a Fully Converged Audiovisual World: Growth, Creation 
and Values, 24.4.2013 COM(2013) 231 final. 
57 25.5.2016, COM(2016) 287 final. Not yet adopted. 
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as is the case with the last one. A move towards regulation of platforms 
is, therefore, the major driving point in the Proposal.  
To understand the impact that the Proposal might have on platforms, 
one must look at the present regulatory regime for video-sharing 
platforms. For something to even qualify as an audio-video media service 
under the 2010 AVMS Directive it has to be under the editorial 
responsibility of a media service provider. If it is not, it would still (likely) 
be covered as an information society service under the E-Commerce 
Directive. Under the Proposal, a completely new category is introduced 
in addition to linear and non-linear services - video-sharing platform 
service. These are defined as  
• storage of a large amount of programmes or user- generated 
videos where the provider has no editorial responsibility 
• organisation of the content is determined by the provider, 
manually or automatically, in particular by hosting, 
displaying, tagging and sequencing;  
• the principle purpose is provision to the general public 
• the service is made available through telecoms networks 
It should be clear that this definition encompasses a very large 
number of platforms of all sizes. Thus defined in very broad terms, 
video sharing platforms are subjected to Article 28a and forced to 
protect minors from content which may impair their physical, mental or 
moral development and protect all citizens against hate speech. In order 
to achieve such objectives, platforms would need to use terms and 
conditions, install mechanisms for users to flag inappropriate content, 
use age verification systems, install mechanisms allowing users to rate the 
harmful content and use parental control systems. The interesting aspect 
of this change is that it is the Member States that are addressees of the 
obligation and not the providers themselves. They are to use, among 
other, co-regulation.58 
The Proposal has been met with mild approval from media 
associations59 but also calls to better adapt to the needs of particular 
professions.60 On the other hand, critics have also been vocal. Analysing 
the text, CERRE concluded that it could endanger the freedom of 
expression and that guidance on what should constitute incitement to 
                                                        
58 On co-regulation in EU law, see Christopher Marsden, Internet Co-Regulation: 
European Law, Regulatory Governance and Legitimacy in Cyberspace (Cambridge 
University Press 2011). 
59 See EBU opinion, available at https://www.ebu.ch/news/2016/05/revision-of-
audiovisual-media-se. 
60 See Cineuropa, 16.4. 2018. http://cineuropa.org/en/newsdetail/351846/. 
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hatred and violence should be established as soon as possible.61 In a 
paper commenting on the trilogue negotiations, EDRI commented that a 
proper definition of user-generated video is needed. It also suggested 
that Article 28a be completely deleted or at least substantially changed 
through amendments.62 
It is difficult to argue against the need to reform the current 
Directive and its broad scope should not leave anyone surprised. First, 
the breadth matches similar interventions in the e-commerce and 
telecoms discussed above. Second, the intervention had been envisaged 
in the 2015 DSM document, when the Commission promised that it 
would look at the rules applicable to “all market players”. It promised at 
that point to examine if the scope of the rules should be extended to 
“new services and players”. This is a typical “level playing field” 
intervention, attempting not to create a new set of objectives and 
principles but trying instead to bring the new media under the scope of 
legacy rules. Most worrying, however, is the explicitness with which both 
the original 2010 AVMS and the 2016 Proposal encompass “platforms”, 
which are simply taken to be modern extensions of regulated media and 
thus, in the lawmakers’ mind at least, justifiably subject to intervention. 
The new platforms may have a separate article dedicated to them, but the 
proposed measures are exactly the same that apply to linear and non-
linear television. The appropriateness of such an approach is 
questionable. It is also difficult to escape a feeling of unease, however, as 
the US Reno v ACLU case63 comes to mind.  
4. THE INTERPLAY OF CONVERGENCE AND REGULATION 
AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES  
The main claim of this article has been that a gradual shift from 
regulating networks and services to regulating platforms is notable in EU 
digital policymaking and that this shift had been prompted by, among 
other things, convergence of services. I argued that the EU’s interest in 
regulating platforms arises partially from convergence, which had erased 
the clear boundaries between networks that provide digital services on 
the content and carrier layers. There is no doubt that technological 
convergence has its effect on the content (information society services) 
                                                        
61 Sally Broughton Micova, Key issues in the AVMSD revision debates: Video-sharing 
platforms and regulator independence, CERRE Position Paper, 19 March 2017. 
62 EDRI, EDRi position on AVMSD trilogue negotiations, 14 September 2017, 
available at https://edri.org/files/AVMSD/edriposition_trilogues_20170914.pdf 
63 In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the US Supreme 
Court struck down anti-indecency provisions of US Communications Decency Act. 
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as well as carrier levels (telecommunications networks and services) 
although the nature of the policy response to this still remains somewhat 
obscure. 
There should, on the surface, be no surprise in EU’s fascination 
with platforms, which have come to represent the powerful and 
dominant intermediaries. In Platform Revolution,64 Parker and others are 
arguing that networked markets are transforming the economy and that 
disruptive platforms are connecting the actors on the market in 
unprecedented ways. Platforms eliminate the gatekeepers typical of the 
linear model and unlock new value. These platforms are made possible 
by network effects and superior marginal economy. But, while it may be 
obvious that the EU takes interest in platforms, why has it shifted its 
regulatory interest from intermediaries? The EU law on intermediaries, 
after all, is well-established and it would have been logical to target them 
instead. Particularly in favour of that would be the relatively broad 
definition of intermediaries both in the E-Commerce Directive itself and 
the subsequent CJEU interpretation of Articles 12-15. There is nothing 
in CJEU case-law that points in the direction of narrowing the scope of 
the original definition. The CJEU case-law on injunctions very clearly 
indicates both that different types of injunctions can be used to prevent 
current and future infringements and that such injunctions must be 
specific in their aims and means.65  
The answer should be sought in the nature of EU regulatory 
intervention concerning platforms, already discussed above. The EU of 
mid 90s and early 2000s sought to position the intermediaries as the 
enablers of the Internet. It thus insulated them from liability, ordered 
Member States not to place unreasonable obstacles to their proliferation 
and sought to subject them only to the laws of their state of origin. The 
post-2015 EU IT policy is of a very different nature. While 
intermediaries have been targeted in the 2000s in order to enable the 
spread of digital services, the focus of the 2015 DSM document is largely 
on creating the level-playing field and constraining the spread of illegal 
content. The policy documents analysed above indicate that the EU is 
committed to maintaining the most important parts of its regulatory 
regime on intermediaries while targeting platforms in fear of their power 
and the consequences of the public’s increased dependence on them. 
                                                        
64 Geoffrey Parler, Marshall W Van Alstyne, Sangeet Paul Choudary, Platfrom 
Revolution (W.W. Norton & Company : New York 2016). 
65 See C-360/10 SABAM, 16 February 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85 and C-314/12 UPC 
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Here, ISSs are still the legitimate regulatory targets, platforms are the 
necessary evil. 
Section 2 shed light on the EU’s growing policy body on platforms 
while Section 3 showed that regulatory interventions are already under 
way. We saw that the EU largely applies the existing regulatory tools to 
new platforms. Critically, however, the tools available in the legacy world 
and taken over by platform-specific laws discussed in Section 3 are by 
their very nature harsh since they target non-compliant intermediaries. 
Thus, full spectrum of ePrivacy obligations on the carrier layer or full 
liability or filtering for intermediaries on the content layer. Such tools are 
designed to catch exceptional illegalities and not created as a toolset 
controlling the operation of intermediaries in normal situations. There is 
no doubt that some of the proposed laws are targeted. This is mainly 
true of the changes proposed to the telecoms framework (although not 
the ePrivacy part). It is also true, however, that the remainder of the 
proposals do not contain essentially new solutions for platforms. The 
EU model is, simply put, too ‘crude’ and too reliant on old ideas. 
But if such responses are questionable, what would the alternatives 
look like? In order to answer that we must recollect that technological 
convergence generates friction when regimes come into conflict. Ibáñez 
Colomo had argued that this is the case where regulatory objectives 
pursued by regulation and specific tools chosen to implement them do 
not match.66 In this situation, legacy tools are used to achieve the new 
and modified objectives. From this point, two paths are possible. The 
first path is to deregulate. In some cases deregulation removes some of 
the assumptions made by legacy regulation. The most typical example of 
this is the EU’s gradual reduction of the number of markets susceptible 
to ex ante telecoms regulation. Another path is the regulatory convergence 
in pursuit of technological convergence. The current “silo” approach is not 
converged but has one regulatory regime for each of the three layers. A 
converged path would result in a gradual creation of a single regulatory 
regime, consisting not only in a unified set of rules covering all (or the 
majority of services) but also in the redefinition of authorities in charge 
of the enforcement. Regulatory convergence may, but does not 
necessarily, mean the development of new tools.  
The lawmaker can react “defensively” to convergence where the 
current objectives are not judged to be in the need of new regulatory 
tools. The 2010 AVMS Directive had simply extended its regime to on-
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demand services, judging the objectives to justify this. The principle of 
technology neutrality, which is built into all EU digital directives on the 
content and carrier layer, takes as a starting point the idea that laws 
should not be drafted with a particular technology in mind. Nevertheless, 
the principle is not designed to prevent regulatory convergence by 
continually applying the same regulatory paradigm to every changing 
technologies. Instead, it is meant to bring extra flexibility by removing 
the need for each new technology to be covered by a matching law. A 
consequence of non-reaction to convergence is the application of several 
regimes to technologically converged services.  
Regulatory convergence need not follow with equal speed in all 
targeted areas and may proceed faster in some. But, what has been EU’s 
reaction? We have seen that there has been early recognition of the 
problem (1997). We have also seen that the vertical approach had not 
been abandoned and that, on the contrary, three “pillars” had been 
maintained, also in the latest round of reforms. That, in itself may not 
signify deeper problems but it indicates, especially in light of the 
proposals discussed in Section 3, that the EU reaction is largely 
defensive. 
In the first section I stated that the fact that services are delivered 
over different networks does not, in the EU lawmaker’s eyes, make these 
services the same nor does it necessarily imply that they should be 
regulated through a single regulatory framework. This crucial statement 
came to inform the EU policy and caused the sector-specific interference 
into platforms. While the convergence made some intervention necessary 
(as we saw in Section 3), the legacy-informed regulatory paradigm 
prevented logical development of a unified approach. 
It is not known to what extent the current regulatory models can be 
applied to platforms. The present regulatory model is, in its essence, a 
collection of legacy objectives and tools. That new regulatory forms 
occasionally need to be invented is a well-known fact but the regulation 
discussed in Section 3 is not new. Section 3.1 explained how OTTs are 
subjected to present laws in a narrow class of cases. Section 3.2 talked 
about the current filtering regime being imposed on platforms in an 
extended set of circumstances and platforms bring forced to disclose 
their ranking criteria. Section 3.3 talked about extending the present 
regime to video-sharing platforms. In none of the cases can there be any 
talk about a new set of rules. Instead, the lawmakers' reaction is the 
same: disruptive platforms are seen to be escaping the present regime, 
are occasionally reprimanded for not doing more themselves, and 
ultimately subjected to stricter laws. 
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I submit that the EU lawmaker's current approach to platforms is 
both too broad in scope and misguided.67 Too broad, because it is not 
clear if platforms necessarily raise any new issues which cannot be dealt 
with through present laws and which would require sweeping 
intervention of the type seen in the proposal on transparency of filtering 
of UGC content. In discussing the pitfalls of regulating platforms, 
Hatzopoulous points out the lack of consensus on definition, the subject 
and the scope of regulation.68 The dilemma is not only whether to 
regulate but also whether to opt for ex ante or ex post, general or 
specific, national or EU. The Commission’s documents to date have 
provided little to no material to support one form of regulation over 
another. Self-regulation – an approach that platforms themselves prefer 
– may very well be adequate but only if properly enforced. 
Misguided, because it misses the key point that convergence has 
been forced upon us and needs to be addressed. The crucial questions 
that need to be asked are: what has convergence done to vertical 
regulation and what needs to be done differently? In a comprehensive 
report based on the examination of services at different layers, CERRE 
suggested that horizontal regulation is better suited to converged 
technological realities. So far, the EU lawmaker had attempted to 
legislate within distinct legal pillars. Instead, converged services need to 
be tackled horizontally - across these circles if and when needed, through 
clear objectives and principles and by good enforcement mechanisms by 
authorities capable of addressing the problem. 
Substitutability ought to be a leading factor in favouring horizontal 
regulation of services. This naturally leads to at least a simplification of 
the regulatory framework to one applying to networks (traditional 
telecoms/carrier) and another to all services (both ISSs and AVMS). 
Even in this division, some regulation on the carrier layer – such as the 
ePrivacy Directive – would almost certainly need to be revised so that it 
does not cover non-telecoms services. The horizontal model would also 
take most advantage of the already existing legislation (competition law, 
consumer protection, privacy, contract law, etc.) 
The problem with the Commission’s approach is not only the lack 
of understanding of the subject that is to be regulated, nor the inherent 
difficulties of regulating it, but the volatility of its approach. While 2015 
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DSM Strategy indicates a soft approach, the 2018 Guidelines moves 
towards a hard one. While earlier regulatory initiatives take a subject-
specific approach, the later ones (such as the 2018 proposal on 
transparency) take a more sweeping brush. And, while the latest proposal 
takes a somewhat new method in emphasizing transparency, the majority 
of the other ones are firmly based on a model of thinking based on 
legacy technologies.  
Convergence is both an important phenomenon and one that has 
been recognised as such in the EU as early as 1997, but the EU 
lawmaker, rather than changing policy objectives and tools in pursuit of 
converged realities, chose to maintain the legacy model of regulation and 
extend its tools to platforms. Nevertheless, the EU lawmaker has been 
thrown into the reality of converged technologies. I indicated that, post-
2015, this has been primarily through the emergence of platform-specific 
regulation. But, rather than attempt to rethink its digital policies, the EU 
has chosen to act defensively - it attempted to translate the regulatory 
objectives and tools form the legacy world to the new and threatening 
phenomenon. Ultimately, it seems that new and more dynamic 
regulatory models may be needed in order to properly address the 
phenomenon of convergence. 
